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NOTES
PROSECUTORIAL COMMENT AND JUDICIAL
INSTRUCTION ON A DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO
TESTIFY: IN SUPPORT OF A LIBERAL
APPLICATION OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT.
INTRODUCTION
The scope of the privilege against self-incrimination, secured by
the fifth amendment, generally has undergone a liberal expansion
from its early history to the present. The privilege has been enhanced
and influenced by liberal policy justifications which have emphasized
protection of the individual.1 Recent Supreme Court decisions,
however, have reversed this trend.! The Burger Court has tended
toward a conservative application of the privilege by ignoring or
construing narrowly the underlying policies of the privilege.8 This
narrowing of the fifth amendment privilege has seriously affected
the right of the defendant not to have his silence commented upon
by the State.
The privilege against self-incrimination developed in England
as a weapon against torture and unjust incarceration of the
accused.' Although such inhumane practices generally were not
followed in colonial America, the privilege was used as a means of
preventing unfair trial procedure. The framers of the Constitution,
by incorporating the privilege into the fifth amendment,
acknowledged that the right against compulsory self-incrimination
was essential to criminal justice.
In its beginning, the privilege against self-incrimination applied
only to the federal courts since the states exercised sovereign con-
trol over state criminal proceedings.5 This policy of comity, however,
became overshadowed by concerns for indivdual rights as a basis for
expanding the scope of the fifth amendment to the states.! These
1. See notes 82-92 infra and accompanying text.
2. See notes 114 and 220 infra and accompanying text.
3. See notes 219-33 infra and accompanying text.
4. See notes 18-20 infra and accompanying text.
5. See notes 45-61 infra and accompanying text.
6. Briefly, these policies, are as follows: preservation of an accusatory
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concerns also provided the impetus for expanding the scope of the
privilege to many areas of criminal procedure. Of particular concern,
for example, was the practice among many state prosecutors and
judges of commenting on a defendant's failure to testify.7 This
conduct was held by the Supreme Court to be an unconstitutional
violation of the fifth amendment.'
Liberal application of the fifth amendment to comments on a
defendant's failure to testify has been curtailed by recent Supreme
Court decisions? No longer does the Court look to the policies
underlying the privilege against self-incrimination." Instead, in the
process of reversing its liberal trend, the Court has placed emphasis
on historical limitations of sovereignty and a narrow interpretation
of the privilege. This regressive trend has particularly affected the
defendant's right against comment on his failure to testify. One
result of the Court's present conservatism has been the application
of a "harmless error" test to unconstitutional comments." In
addition, the Court recently has shown its unwillingness to
guarantee further protection against such comments by refusing to
hold that jury instructions on the right to remain silent, when given
over the defendant's objections, constitute an impermissible viola-
tion of his privilege against self-incrimination.
The purpose of this note is to analyze the development of the
privilege against self-incrimination and its underlying policies, and
to examine their implications for the accused's right against com-
ment on his failure to testify. The discussion is limited in scope to
those cases and issues which have developed around the Supreme
Court's interpretations of the constitutionality of prosecutorial and
judicial comment, and judicial instructions, on the accused's exercise
of his right to remain silent.
judicial system; protection from unjust conviction; maintenance of fair state-individual
balance; insurance of a reliable guilt-determination process; preservation of official in-
tegrity. For a discussion of the above policies, see notes 84-93 infra and accompanying
text.
7. States which permitted both comment upon and inference from a defen-
dant's failure to testify were California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New Mexico,
and Ohio. See Note, Griffin v. California, Comment on An Accused's Failure to Testify
Prohibited by the Fifth Amendment, 70 DICK. L. REV. 98 n.5 (1965).
8. See text discussion of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), infra ac-
companying notes 101-07.
9. See notes 118-23 and 221-31 infra and accompanying text.
10. See notes 118-23 and 229-31 infra and accompanying text.
11. For full discussion of the harmless error rule as applied to unconstitu-
tional comment see notes 118-57 infra and accompanying text.
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THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
HISTORY AND EARLY POLICY OF THE PRIVILEGE
The privilege against self-incrimination developed over many
centuries of judicial history and has gone through a number of
transformations and interpretations in the process.' Despite the
long history of the privilege, the records of its development are few
in number and sketchy at best. Consequently, historical interpreta-
tions have been marked by divergent views."1 Nevertheless, a brief
analysis of the origins of the privilege and the policies surrounding
its development may be a valuable tool in understanding the present
scope and meaning of the right against self-incrimination and the
defendant's right against comment on his courtroom silence.'
Struggle between the royal government and the Church of
England marked the origins of the privilege against self-
incrimination, and only later did this right become an integral ele-
ment of judicial due process. The main dispute centered around the
oath ex officio mero."5 Resistance to the oath had been primarily a
jurisdictional struggle between the State and the ordinary church,
and between the ecclesiastical and the common law courts." But
thereafter, as governmental courts were gaining ground, the objec-
tions against compulsory self-accusation focused upon the methods
used in criminal proceedings.
In the early 1500's the focus of the privilege shifted with the
establishment of two new courts used for essentially political
purposes. 7 The government of Charles I had embarked on an anti-
Puritan program which embittered many segments of the popula-
12. See generally L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT, THE RIGHT
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION (1968) [hereinafter cited as LEVY]; 8 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2250 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
13. Compare WIGMORE, supra note 12, with Pittman, The Colonial and Con-
stitutional History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 21 VA. L. REV. 763
(1935).
14. Thompson, Judge Friendly's Amendment to the Fifth Amendment: A
Comment on a Recent Criticism of the Supreme Court. 38 U. CIN. L. REV. 488, 493
(1969). Thompson suggests that the central focus should be on the policies behind the
privilege.
15. The oath ex officio was a proceeding frequently used by ecclesiastical
courts whereby an accused was required to answer all questions asked of him by an in-
quisitor, no matter how incriminating. See WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2250, at 276.
16. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2250, at 272.
17. The Court of High Commission in Causes Ecclesiastical and the Court of
Star Chamber raised special antagonism during Charles I's reign. These courts, both
carrying out ecclesiastical rules, vigorously used the ex officio oath to destroy heresy.
Id. at 278-79.
19791
Brown: Prosecutorial Comment and Judicial Instruction on a Defendant's F
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1979
264 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13
tion, and the struggle against self-accusation became enmeshed in
the fight for religious and political freedom. 8 In policing the
dioceses, the High Commission conducted inquisitions and used the
ex officio oaths as the "instruments of these persecutions."'9 The
theory of the Commission, which has been echoed today, was that an
innocent man had nothing to hide and the truth could not hurt him.
Further, the Commission reasoned that only the guilty defendant
had reason to refuse the oath and could not thereafter claim in-
justice when convicted as if he had confessed.0 This theory provided
the rationale for governmental persecution of political and religious
dissidents through judicial means.
The courts wielded their persecutory powers under the oath
for over one and a half centuries until a feisty and embittered
Puritan, John Lilburn, "focused the attention of the whole of
England on the injustice of forcing a man to be a means of his own
undoing."" His famous case' in 1641 was the primary cause of the
oath's abolition. One of Lilburn's central objections was that he had
been denied due process under the law by violations of his right not
to be asked questions concerning himself. Parliament decided that
his sentence had been illegal, and abolished further administration
of the ex officio oath.5 Thereafter, the privilege against self-
incrimination became an established rule of the common law.
The right against self-incrimination, enhanced and influenced
by other underlying principles and concepts," soon received a more
liberal treatment from the courts. One significant development was
extension of the privilege to protect a person from being compelled
to testify as to matters that merely tended to disgrace him.2 5 In fact,
18. LEVY, supra note 12, at 265.
19. Thompson, supra note 14, at 489. The Commission would give the oath
and require the accused to give a complete and truthful testimony under penalty of
death for swearing falsely. See WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2250, at 279.
20. LEVY, supra note 12, at 269.
21. I& at 271.
22. Lflburn's Trial, 3 How. St. Tr. (1637-45). For a summary of the trial, see
WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2250 at 782-83.
23. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 115, at 246 (2d ed.
1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK].
24. Such underlying policies were as follows: an accused is innocent until prov-
en guilty; a person's home should not be searched for papers or documents; torture or
cruelty in forcing confessions is illegal; policies of individual freedom and dignity. See
LEVY, supra note 12, at 331; MCCORMICK, supra note 23, at 247.
25. The courts also extended the privilege to civil actions, and eventually to
papers and documents. LEVY, supra note 12, at 317-19; MCCORMICK, supra note 23, at
246.
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the courts had become so concerned with protecting the right of the
accused that the defendant was not permitted to testify on his own
behalf."6 The courts fully accepted the liberal construction given to
the privilege, and by the end of the seventeenth century the accus-
ed's right against self-incrimination had become part of the due pro-
cess of law and a fundamental principle of the accusatorial system.'
Firmly established in England by the seventeenth century, the
privilege against self-incrimination was inherited by the new col-
onies as part of the common law. The right emerged from cir-
cumstances similar to the religious and political turmoil in England.,
Many of the colonial states had procedural rules that allowed prac-
tices similar to the ex officio oath, and by the mid-seventeenth cen-
tury, Puritans who protested forced compliance with an established
church demanded protection against self-accusation. As a conse-
quence of such demands, most New England colonies had adopted
the privilege by the late 1600's."
As the freedom from self-incrimination became an established
and respected right, the courts developed and liberalized the
privilege to fit the changing values of the colonists. 0 To the colonial
courts, the privilege against self-incrimination meant protection
from punishment, forfeiture, or penalty which might force an in-
dividual to accuse himself. Later the scope of the privilege was fur-
ther liberalized by the Bill of Rights." The unique phrase in the Bill,
that no one could be compelled to be a witness against himself, was
an emphatic step toward a more liberal application of the right."
26. The reason for the rule was twofold: the defendant would give false
testimony since he had a personal stake in the outcome of the trial; and the defendant
should be protected from cross-examination to which he might give self-incriminatory
responses. LEVY, supra note 12, at 327-28. Levy notes further that these divergent
principles work toward a common end which was to prevent the accused from being
subjected to questions which would lead to self-incriminating answers.
27. Id. at 332.
28. America had its share of political and religious problems. The laws against
treason and sedition were strictly enforced, and the Non-Conformists were persecuted.
See Pittman, supra note 13, at 775.
29. Id. at 775-79; LEVY, supra note 12, at 367-68.
30. For the early colonies the privilege was against compulsory self-
accusation, and could be invoked by the defendant only during preliminary examina-
tions. The defendant was deprived of counsel, and was subjected to comments and
questions from opposing counsel and the court. See LEVY, supra note 12, at 375.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. I-X.
32. This phrase "Jijmports a principle of wider reach, applicable .. .to the
self-production of any adverse evidence that made one the herald of his own infamy,
thereby disgracing him." LEVY, supra note 12, at 427.
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Little debate surrounded the incorporation of the phrase into the
Constitution; this fact alone exemplifies the widespread acceptance
and respect for such a fundamental right.5  The privilege
embraced by the Constitution had changed significantly from its
colonial construction. It had become a flexible right not limited to a
ban on torture, but including also the basic belief that an accused
should not be forced to aid the state in his own conviction."
The foregoing historical overview affords only a glimpse into
the way underlying values and policies shaped and influenced the
privilege against self-incrimination. Such an overview, however,
demonstrates that the framers of the Constitution inherited a flexi-
ble right to be applied in any manner to further due process. The
framers did not intend that the phrase "[n]o person ... shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself' be ap-
plied in a vacuum. Rather, they most likely intended that the seem-
ingly simple phrase be altered and developed by constantly chang-
ing values and notions of due process." If there is one essential
lesson to be learned by modern courts from the historical develop-
ment of the fifth amendment, it is that the privilege against self-
incrimination is a flexible and fundamental right meant to further
the ends of justice and due process under the law.
COMMENT ON DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO TESTIFY:
APPLICATION OF THE PRIVILEGE
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination receiv-
ed widespread approval among the several states, and eventually
almost all states incorporated similar clauses into their constitu-
tions." Along with this general acceptance, however, there emerged
strong criticism of these constitutional privileges. Opposition to the
privilege, ranging from curtailment to abolition of the right,M clash-
33. Levy concludes that the right was "simply taken for granted and so deep-
ly accepted that its constitutional expression had the mechanical quality of a ritualistic
gesture in favor of a self-evident truth needing no explanation." LEVY, supra note 12,
at 427.
34. Id. at 430-31.
35. "Possibly the framers had the foresight to realize that time would change
and that this safeguard had to be flexible enough to bend with the needs of a growing,
democratic society." Note, 70 DICK. L. REV., supra note 7, at 99.
36. All of the original thirteen colonies except New Jersey adopted similar
provisions in their state constitutions. Afterwards, as each state was admitted to the
Union, all except Iowa adopted similar provisions. See WIGMOSE, supra note 12, § 2252.
37. See notes 59-65 infra and accompanying text.
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ed with new policies emerging as justification for extension of the
privilege to many new areas of judicial process."
The Fifth Amendment and the States
Historically, the privilege against self-incrimination affected
the defendant only in regard to pre-trial procedure, since he was not
permitted to testify on his own behalf until the nineteenth century. 9
The accused could testify as to extenuating circumstances, but the
problem of self-incrimination did not arise in this situation.0 In the
mid-nineteenth century, however, almost every state had passed a
statute providing the accused with capacity to testify." Since testi-
fying was itself a form of self-incrimination, many states"' and the
federal government passed statutes forbidding comment on a defen-
dant's failure to exercise the right to testify.3 Generally, most
states and the federal government agreed that comment by the
judge or prosecutor on the defendant's failure to testify was
incongruous with the right against self-incrimination, but the
standards of application of that privilege quickly diverged." The
principal inquiry, therefore, became whether the privilege was a fun-
damental, natural right that uniformly extended to the states.
None of the Bill of Rights provisions was applicable to the
states." Consequently, the federal government was powerless to
force the states to adopt a uniform standard of application of the
right against self-incrimination. This situation remained unchanged
until the ratification of the fourteenth amendment," which provided
that the privileges and immunities granted all citizens should not be
abridged by the states.'7 The fourteenth amendment opened the way
38. See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 23, § 118, at 251-53; see also Thomp-
son, supra note 14, at 495-500.
39. See MCCORMICK, supra note 23, at 246.
40. Note, 70 DICK. L. REV., supra note 7, at 100.
41. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAW. ANN. ch. 233, § 20 (Michie/Law Co-op Cum. Supp.
1972); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1315 (West Cum. Supp. 1965-78); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19, § 631 (1964).
42. See note 7 supra.
43. The Act of Congress of March 16, 1878, provided that the accused's
"failure to request to be a witness in the case shall not create any presumption against
him." Act of March 16, 1878, 20 Stat. 30, ch. 37 (Emphasis in original).
44. Note, 70 DICK. L. REV., supra note 7, at 101.
45. In Barron v. City of Baltimore, 10 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), the Court urged
that none of the Bill of Rights provisions extended to the states.
46. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
47. However, in the Slaughter House cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), the
Court interpreted the fourteenth amendment to apply to national citizenship only.
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for extending the federal privilege against self-incrimination to the
practice among the states of commenting upon a defendant's failure
to testify.
In 1893, the issue of comment on an accused's failure to testify
reached the Supreme Court for the first time in Wilson v. United
States." The Court was not faced with the problem of extending the
fifth amendment to the states since the case had been brought from
the federal courts; nor did the Court have to decide the constitu-
tionality of comments since a federal statute already covered this
situation. 9 Nevertheless, Wilson was a significant impetus for later
widening the scope of the right to remain silent. The Court held
that comment which created or tended to create a presumption
against the defendant from his failure to testify violated federal
law." The decision emphasized that essential to the privilege was
the underlying policy that the accused must be protected from
danger of unjust conviction. This danger exists when the defendant
who has a poor demeanor risks giving the jury a bad impression
from his testimony." The Court indicated further that comment on
the accused's silence would violate the fifth amendment, since such
practice penalizes the defendant for exercising his constitutional
right against compulsion to testify.2 Consequently, the Wilson case
opened the door for greater protection of the accused's right to
remain silent.
Criticism of the federal law prohibiting comments on the defen-
dant's silence, however, increased as the debate sharpened over
whether the federal standard should be extended to the states. In
1908, the Court in Twining v. New Jersey," was presented with the
same problem it confronted nearly forty years later in Adamson v.
Also, it was feared that full extension of the Bill of Rights would destroy the balance
of power between the federal and state governments.
48. 149 U.S. 60 (1893). The Court held that comment on the accused's failure
to testify violated the federal statute prohibiting such comment. See note 51 infra.
49. See note 43 supra.
50. 149 U.S. at 67.
51. The Court stated in the Wilson case:
It is not everyone who can safely venture on the witness stand though en-
tirely innocent of the charge against him. Excessive timidity, nervousness
when facing others and attempting to explain transactions of a suspicious
character, and offenses charged against him, will often confuse and em-
barass him as to increase rather than remove prejudices against him.
Id. at 66.
52. Id. at 67.
53. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
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California." The issue presented in both cases was whether a state
court's instruction that the jury may draw an unfavorable inference
from defendant's failure to testify was a violation of the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination. The Twining Court assum-
ed, without deciding, that comment on an accused's silence violated
the right against self-incrimination.55 Nevertheless, the Court held
that this right was not extended to the states by the fourteenth
amendment." In the Adamson case,57 the argument that comment on
the accused's silence as allowed by state practice violated the four-
teenth amendment was again rejected.55 Similar to the Twining
reasoning, the Court assumed that such comment violated the
constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination; yet the Court
refused to extend this rule to the sovereign states.
The Court's refusal to extend the privilege against self-
incrimination received support from many opponents of an expanded
constitutional right to remain silent." Proponents of state sovereignty
over state criminal procedure generally agreed that the administra-
tion of criminal justice in the various states was a matter of purely
local concern.6 The central policy argument for this position, as
reflected in Twining and Adamson, rested on countervailing notions
of federalism. Since the Constitution did not demand that the Bill of
Rights regulate state courts, it was argued that no state could be
compelled by the fifth amendment to prevent comment on an accus-
ed's silence."' Such practice, therefore, could only be governed by
state law.
In addition to the concern for balance between state and
federal governments, many- opponents of the expanded right called
54. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
55. 211 U.S. at 97.
56. The irony of this decision has been pointed out: "Twining in effect said
that it was permissible for a state to deprive its citizens of rights fundamental to all
free men and to do so without its citizens having any recourse except to the very court
that had deprived them of that right." Note, 70 DICK. L. REV., supra note 7, at 103.
57. The defendant challenged article one, section three of the California Con-
stitution, which permitted a court to instruct the jury that adverse inferences could be
drawn from a defendant's failure to testify, and allowed a prosecutor to comment on a
defendant's silence.
58. The Court emphasized in Adamson, as in Twining, its policy of strong
federalism.
59. Bruce, The Right to Comment on the Failure of the Defendant to Testify,
31 MICH. L. REV. 226 (1932); Dunmore, Comment on Failure of the Accused to Testify,
26 YALE L.J. 464 (1917); Terry, Constitutional Provisions Against Forcing Self-
Incrimination, 15 YALE L.J. 127 (1905).
60. See Terry, supra note 59, at 129.
61. Id.
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for a curtailed standard of application.62 Other critics argued for
complete abandonment of the privilege." Several policy reasons
were set forth to support their contention that the fifth amendment
should not be used to protect an accused from comment on his exer-
cise of the right to remain silent."' Opponents argued that historical-
ly the privilege against self-incrimination had evolved as a means of
preventing the use of physical torture in compelling a person to re-
spond to general inquiries."5 Since comment on the accused's failure
to testify was not physical compulsion, they argued, such practice
was not barred by the right against self-incrimination.6 Still others
believed that the liberal extension of the privilege served only as an
unwarranted protection of the criminal,"7 while circumventing essen-
tial prosecutorial techniques. Such was the basis for support of the
practice of many states which permitted the court and prosecutor to
mention defendant's failure to testify, and allowed the jury to draw
inferences from this silence."
In 1964, the Supreme Court in Malloy v. Hogan70 halted the
divergent applications of the privilege against self-incrimination by
the state courts. Despite the long line of decisions in which the
Court had refused to extend the fifth amendment to the states, the
62. See Bruce, supra note 59, at 230-31.
63. See, e.g., Note, Comment on Defendant's Failure to Take the Stand, 57
YALE L.J. 145 (1947). "The removal of the statutory prohibition on comment would not
only eliminate the constant threat of reversal, but would also remove one of the bar-
riers to truth in criminal trials." Id. at 149.
64. See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 23, § 118; WIGMORE, supra note 12,
§ 2251.
65. See MCCORMICK, supra note 23, at 251; Note, 57 YALE L.J. 145, supra note
63.
66. "All that was in the minds of the framers of the constitutional provisions
was the desire to prevent injustice and direct compulsion. Theirs was a protest against
and a fear of the inquisition of torture .... " Bruce, supra note 59, at 233.
67. See note 63 supra. See also J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE
(1827).
68. Terry, supra note 59, at 129; W. MEYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT? 229-31 (1959).
69. In 1932, the American Law Institute adopted a resolution that "the judge,
the prosecuting attorney and counsel for the defense may comment upon the fact that
defendant did not testify." 9 PRoc. Am. L. INST. 202-18 (1932). The American Bar
Association passed a similar proposal: "[Bly law it should be permitted to the pros-
ecutor to comment to the jury on the fact that a defendant did not take the stand as a
witness; and to the jury to draw reasonable inferences." 56 A.B.A. REP. 137-52 (1932).
For a forceful argument against these proposals see Reeder, Comment Upon Failure of
Accused to Testify, 31 MICH. L. REV. 40 (1932).
70. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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Malloy Court held that the fourteenth amendment prohibited abridg-
ment of the guarantee against self-incrimination by a state. This
decision made it clear that state application of the privilege must be
consistent with federal constitutional standards:
The Fourteenth Amendment secures against state inva-
sion the same privilege that the Fifth Amendment
guarantees against federal infringement-the right of a
person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the
unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penal-
ty, as held in Twining, for such silence.1
The court further indicated that a strong basis for its decision was
the policy underlying the coerced confession cases-that courts are
compelled by the Constitution to establish guilt by evidence in-
dependently secured.72 Thus, in effect, violation of the right to
remain silent constituted a penalty which amounted to coercion and
was prohibited by the fifth and fourteenth amendments. In speaking
of the shift to a broadened application of the fifth amendment, the
Court stated that the change reflected a recognition that our
"system of criminal prosecution is accusatorial, not inquisatorial,"
and that the fifth amendment privilege was essential to the fur-
therance of such a system. 3 Malloy made it clear that states could
no longer interpret the privilege in a manner inconsistent with the
Constitution; rather, they must employ the federal constitutional
standard in light of countervailing policies which required its broad
application.
The importance of the shift in the Supreme Court's opinion
from Twining to Malloy was not simply that the fifth amendment
applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment; the central
point of analysis had shifted as well. In Twining and subsequent
cases,7' the Court analyzed the problem of extending the fifth
amendment privilege to the states in terms of historical concerns for
federalism., State sovereignty, however, seemed less important as
the desire for procedural due process increased. Therefore, as the
Court's emphasis in Malloy shifted to countervailing concerns,7" the
71. Id. at 8.
72. Id. at 7-8.
73. Id. at 7.
74. See notes 53-61 supra and accompanying text.
75. Id.
76. See Noonan, Jr., Inferences From the Invocation of the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 41 VA. L. REv. 311 (1955).
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historical foundations gave way to policies which reflected strong
due process considerations."
Emerging Policy and Extension of the Privilege
Although the emphasis in analysis had shifted markedly in
Malloy, the Court did not specifically extend the privilege against
self-incrimination to bar prosecutorial and judicial comments on a
defendant's failure to testify until it decided Griffin v. California in
1965.8 Perhaps the Court's reluctance to hold in Malloy that the
fifth amendment prevented such comments stemmed from the en-
durance of strong opposition to the privilege."9 Opponents of the
privilege had strengthened historical support for federalism, and the
Malloy Court refused to meet the opposition head-on. 0 These oppos-
ing contentions, however, were later disregarded in the Griffin case,
which, influenced by Malloy, extended the prohibition against un-
constitutional comment to the states."
The contention that the privilege against self-incrimination was
limited historically to physical torture was rejected by Malloy, as
the Court recognized the necessary policy of protecting an accused
from other forms of compulsion less heinous than torture. 2 The use
of any form of physical force, such as incarceration or threats of
force, to extract admissions of guilt violated the privilege against
self-incrimination.2 More important, other policy justifications for
the right to remain silent evolved without regard to its traditional
77. See Note, 70 DICK. L. REV., supra note 7, at 109-10, suggesting that Twin-
ing and Malloy are compatible decisions because they each are a reflection of their
times. In 1908, strong local interests, which demanded a balancing of powers, ran con-
tra to any extension of federal power to state procedure. In 1964, the Malloy Court
faced a different society which sought wide protection for individual rights.
78. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
79. See notes 59-69 supra and accompanying text for representative
arguments in opposition to the privilege.
80. Note, 70 DICK. L. REV., supra note 7, at 110.
81. See notes 101-11 supra and accompanying text.
82. The Supreme Court decided in Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323
(1959), that the fifth amendment prohibited inducing a person to confess through "sym-
pathy falsely aroused." Then in Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963), the Court
determined that obtaining answers to self-incriminatory questions through imprison-
ment was also unconstitutional. In light of the Spano and Haynes decisions, the Court
held in the Malloy case: "Governments, state and federal, are thus constitutionally
compelled to establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured, and may
not by coercion prove a charge against an accused out of his own mouth." 378 U.S. at
8.
83. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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role. Consequently, the historical limitations on the right began to
weaken under the increasing weight given to individual interests
and the right to due process.
The increasing emphasis on procedural due process shifted the
function of the privilege from its historical role to one of protecting
an accused from unjustified conviction.8 ' The Court realized, as it
had in Wilson,85 that the accused's demeanor could weigh heavily
against him. For instance, if a defendant took the stand despite ex-
cessive nervousness or bad mannerisms, this appearance alone
would likely create inferences in the juror's mind adverse to the ac-
cused."' The danger of a defendant being convicted due to his poor
demeanor was, therefore, a form of self-incrimination prohibited by
the privilege. In addition, the privilege ensured the accusatory
nature of our system. 7 In accordance with this view the Court in
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission" held that comment on the
refusal to testify was part of the "inquisatorial system of criminal
justice,"8 and repugnant to the policy of preserving the accusatory
system.
The above policies which supported the use of the fifth amend-
ment to insure procedural fairness were derived in part from a
broader function of the privilege against self-incrimination. The
privilege was seen as essential to the policy of "fair contest"90 be-
tween the individual and the state. In this context the privilege en-
sured "a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government
to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturb-
ing him and by requiring the government in its contest with the in-
dividual to shoulder the entire load."'" The privilege also served the
84. See generally MCCORMICK. supra note 23, at 252.
85. See note 51 supra.
86. See Comment, Comment and Inference Under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, 25 OHIO S.L.J. 578, 597 (1964).
87. The Court in Malloy had emphasized that its decision to extend the fifth
amendment was partially based on recognition that the American system of criminal
prosecution was accusatorial, not inquisitorial. 378 U.S. at 7.
88. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
89. Id. at 55.
90. See MCCORMICK, supra note 23, § 118, at 252-53; see also WIGMORE, supra
note 12, at 317.
91. 378 U.S. at 55. Contra, Comment, 25 OHIO S.L.J., supra note 86, at 594,
suggesting that the protection of the individual against the state should not be applied
to comment and inference at trial because many trial safeguards are available, and the
state has shown good reason to "disturb" the defendant by obtaining an indictment, or
through the prosecutor's evidence.
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policy of protecting government morality by removing the tempta-
tion to employ shortcuts to conviction that degrade judicial integri-
ty. 92 This policy was based on the fear that the government could
abuse the right to compel incriminating testimony. Such practice
severely undermined the state-individual balance and hindered a
defendant's right to due process. Therefore, the best security for
the individual against such abuse would be a complete prohibition of
any form of compulsion to testify."'
The Malloy case thus opened the door for the Griffin decision
in two significant ways: first, the Court permitted the fourteenth
amendment to be used as an implement in reaching state court
application of the privilege; second, the policies underlying that deci-
sion justified extension of the privilege in the interests of due pro-
cess." These basic policies combined with developing state and
federal policies to pave the way for elimination of the practice of
permitting comment on defendant's failure to testify."
The Privilege Under Griffin v. California-Policy Considerations
In light of the increasing significance of the individual's rights
in criminal prosecution, proponents of the privilege argued forceful-
ly against the practice of permitting comment on the accused's
failure to testify. Many opponents of the privilege criticized its ap-
plication to prosecutorial comments, asserting it served only as a
shelter for the criminal." This view, however, had been dispelled
earlier by the Supreme Court in Ullman v. United States." Those
who favored the use of comments contended that such practice was
not a direct, physical compulsion prohibited by the fifth amendment,
but was at best "moral compulsion."" Hence, it was argued, com-
ments on a defendant's failure to testify did not violate the right
against self-incrimination.
92. McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 SuP. CT. REV. 193,
199; see also, Griswold, The Right to Be Let Alone 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 216, 223 (1960).
93. Griswold, supra note 92.
94. See notes 71-77 supra and accompanying text.
95. See MCCORMICK. supra note 23, § 118, at 251-53.
96. See Bruce, 31 MIcH. L. REV., supra note 59, at 233-34; Note, 57 YALE L.J.,
supra note 63, at 149.
97. 350 U.S. 422 (1956). The Court stated in Ullman that those who viewed
the privilege as a shelter for the wrongdoer too readily assumed that those who invoke
it are guilty of crime. "Such a view," the Court stated, "does scant honor to the
patriots who sponsored the Bill of Rights as a condition to acceptance of the Constitu-
tion by the ratifying states." Id. at 426-27.
98. Bruce, supra note 59, at 333.
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Proponents of a more flexible application of the privilege
responded that comment was indeed compulsion which created a
real danger of abridgment of defendant's rights. Even though the
nature of the compulsion was mental rather than physical, it was
compulsion nonetheless, since an accused will feel more compelled to
testify when he is aware that his silence will be commented upon
than he would if he knows that his silence will pass unmentioned by
the prosecution. 0 Under these circumstances, if the prosecutor were
permitted to remark that the defendant had not taken the stand, the
accused would have suffered a penalty for exercising his constitu-
tional right because unfavorable inferences would have been created
in the jurors' minds. 10 In response to these procedural dangers,
strong policy reasons emerged as justification for extension of the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination to prohibiting
comment on the accused's failure to testify.
Policy arguments against comments on a failure to testify
provided the foundation upon which the Supreme Court based its
decision to extend the fifth amendment protection to the silent
defendant. The fact situation facing the Court in Griffin v. Califor-
nia,"' similar to that presented in Twining and Adamson, involved a
challenge to the California Constitution provision permitting the
court to instruct the jury that inferences may be drawn from the ac-
cused's silence."' The Court in Griffin held that the fifth amendment
"forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence
or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt."'0 3
Furthermore, the Court made it clear that the "no comment" rule
extended to the states by reason of the fourteenth amendment.'"
The Court thereby reached a decision quite different from its
opinions in Twining and Adamson.
This reversal of the Court's stance was not surprising,
considering the substantial change in underlying policies which had
occurred during the span of time between the decisions. Earlier
decisions had been influenced by historical limitations on the
99. Comment, 25 OHIo S.L.J., supra note 86, at 585.
100. Id at 595.
101. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
102. Article one, section thirteen of the California Constitution provided: a
defendant's "failure to explain or deny by his testimony any evidence or facts in the
case against him may be commented upon by the court and by counsel, and may be
considered by the court or the jury." CALIF. CONST., art. I, § 13 (1934, repealed 1974).
103. 380 U.S. at 615.
104. Id
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privilege against self-incrimination and traditional notions of
federalism.1 5 The situation in 1965, however, was quite different. By
that time the Court had extended the fifth amendment to the states
via the fourteenth amendment. 06 More importantly, emerging
policies justifying this extension emphasized notions of procedural
due process and the rights of the individual against state encroach-
ment. 07
Policies which emphasized due process and individual rights
formed the foundation for the Griffin opinion. As in the Wilson case,
the Court stressed that a defendant often chose not to testify
because he feared his presence on the stand would cause the jury to
draw unwarranted inferences against him. The fifth amendment
therefore granted the defendant a right to remain silent as a means
of protection from unfair inferences."' Mention of an accused's
refusal to testify encouraged adverse inference, and thus constituted
a penalty for exercising a constitutional right. The Court emphasiz-
ed that such practice was contrary to the accusatorial system, and
that comment violated a defendant's fifth amendment privilege since
"[i]t cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly."'" In
rejecting the contention that adverse inferences from defendant's
silence were so irresistible that comment thereon did not increase
the possibility of inference, the Court stated "What the jury may in-
fer, given no help from the court, is one thing. What it may infer
when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused into evidence
against him is quite another."'' 0 Griffin thereby opened the fifth
amendment door wider than ever before, yet left many questions
unanswered. For example, the Court did not determine what degree
of compulsion was required to constitute a violation of the fifth
amendment, or whether all remarks had to be "adverse" before
violation could be found. If a violation were found, the Court did not
state whether such error would require automatic reversal. Even
though not specifically addressed in Griffin, these issues, inter-
preted in light of liberal policies, presented areas for future expan-
sion of the privilege.
The Supreme Court demonstrated in Griffin, as it had in
Malloy, that the fifth and fourteenth amendments were not to be
105. See notes 53-61 supra and accompanying text.
106. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
107. See notes 70-93 supra and accompanying text.
108. 380 U.S. at 613.
109. Id. at 614.
110. Id.
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applied in a vacuum, apart from the realities of the legal world.
Rather, the privilege against self-incrimination as interpreted by the
Court should reflect the policies of the time."' The Court showed its
willingness to ignore historical limitations on the privilege in order
to effectuate fundamental notions of procedural fairness for the
state and federal defendants. The Court in essence recognized that
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination must be
flexible to be effective. The Griffin case, however, left open many
questions to be determined by future interpretation and application
of the privilege.
APPLICATION OF THE "HARMLESS ERROR" RULE
The decision in Griffin v. California"2 was encouraging to pro-
ponents of a broad application of the privilege against self-
incrimination. The fifth amendment was viewed as complete in-
surance against any encroachments on the defendant's rights; the
principles of fair justice and individual dignity would prevail."'
These assumptions soon ended. Hopes of continued expansion of the
accused's privilege against comment on his failure to testify were
dissipated by the Supreme Court in 1967 in Chapman v. California."'
This case restricted the impact of the "no comment" rule by for-
mulating a "harmless error" rule for violations of Griffin.
Chapman v. California
Shortly after the Griffin decision, state courts divided on the
issue of whether courtroom comment on defendant's failure to
testify required automatic reversal, and, if not, whether states were
obliged to apply a federal "harmless error" standard. Many courts
held that remarks by a prosecutor or judge were prejudicial per se
and required reversal without regard to the character of the com-
ment."' Conversely, other states diluted the "no comment" rule
through application of state "harmless error" rules to violations of
Griffin." These states pointed to the fact that there was a split in
federal court decisions on whether every violation of due process
was prejudicial per se."' Thus, it was argued, where comment had
111. See notes 84-93 supra and accompanying text.
112. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
113. See Note, 70 DICK. L. Rzv., supra note 7, at 117-20.
114. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
115. E.g., Miller v. State, 240 Ark. 590, 401 S.W.2d 15 (1966); Singleton v.
State, 183 So. 2d 245 (Fla. App. 1966).
116. E.g., People v. Bostick, 62 Cal. 2d 820, 402 P.2d 529, 44 Cal. Rptr. 649
(1965).
117. 402 P.2d at 531, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 651.
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occurred at trial, the conviction should not be reversed unless the
remark constituted prejudicial error under state law.
The problem of whether a comment violative of the fifth
amendment privilege was prejudicial per se came before the Court
in Chapman. The petitioners in Chapman had been convicted of
murder in a California state court. At their trial, the State's
attorney mentioned numerous times that the defendants had not
taken the stand. The court then charged the jury that it could draw
reasonable inferences from the petitioners' silence. This procedure
obviously violated Griffin."8 The California Supreme Court, admit-
ting that petitioners had been denied a federal constitutional right
by comments on their silence, affirmed the conviction based on
California's harmless error provision." 9 The Supreme Court revers-
ed, holding that whether the violation of a federal right in a trial
requires reversal is a matter of federal rather than state law.',, The
Court then considered what federal standard should be applied. In
Chapman, it was acknowledged that there are some constitutional
rights so basic to a fair trial that their infringement could never be
regarded as "harmless" error."' The Court stated, however, that the
right of a defendant not to have his invocation of the privilege com-
mented upon was not a right of this nature." Hence, infractions of
the "no comment" rule would be subject to review according to a
federal harmless error rule. The rule required that before a federal
constitutional error could be held harmless, "the court must be able
to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.""' Without further elucidation of the rule, the Court revers-
ed, holding that the extensive comments in Chapman were not
118. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 19.
119. The California Constitution provided: "No judgment shall be set aside, or
new trial granted ... for aniy error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an ex-
amination of the entire cause, . . . the court shall be of the opinion that the error com-
plained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice." CAL. CONST., art. VI, § 41/z (1911,
repealed 1968).
120. 386 U.S. at 21.
121. Id. at 23. Constitutional violations which could never be "harmless" were
as follows: coerced confession; denial of the right to representation by counsel at trial;
right to be tried by an impartial judge.
122. The Court concluded, "there may be some constitutional errors which in
the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may ...
be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction." 386 U.S.
at 22.
123. Id. at 24. The Court based this rule on that espoused in Fahy v. Connec-
ticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963): "[W]hether there is reasonable possibility that the
evidence complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."
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harmless. The Court thereby settled the dispute over whether un-
constitutional infringement of the "no comment" rule may be
harmless. Unfortunately, no explanation was given for the almost
total disregard for the policies expounded in Griffin.
Problems in Application of the "Harmless Error" Rule
The cursory treatment given the federal harmless error rule in
Chapman, with little explanation of why the rule applies to viola-
tions of a defendant's right to have his silence pass unmentioned,
has been the focus of much criticism over the past decade." 4 At the
same time, concrete justification for harmless error rule as applied
to comment on a defendant's failure to testify has been sparse. One
argument favoring the rule's application in these circumstances is
that the right of an accused not to have his silence mentioned at
trial is not a constitutional right of such importance as requires
reversal."5 This pedantic viewpoint ignores the dependence of the
criminally accused upon constitutionally guaranteed rights of fair
trial and due process. Abrogation of these rights, no matter how
slight, may subject the defendant to the danger of unfair conviction.
Justice Stewart, concurring only in the result of Chapman,
forcefully opposed the notion that unconstitutional comment is per-
missible. Stewart pointed to the long line of cases in which the
Court had rejected the prospect that constitutional violations might
be disregarded on the ground that they were "harmless." '126
Significantly, these cases placed little if any importance on whether
the error had played any role in the defendant's conviction, and re-
quired automatic reversal for the violations of constitutional
rights." Comment on an accused's failure to testify is an imper-
missible violation of a defendant's constitutional rights, and may
require automatic reversal as a safeguard.
Another argument justifying the federal harmless error rule
has been that the need for preservation of defendant's rights
against impermissible comment is outweighed by the need for
judicial economy and finality of judgment.'28 The rule, it is argued,
prevents reversal where "small errors or defects" were
committed, 29 thereby saving time-consuming retrial. This misguided
124. See notes 130-36 infra and accompanying text.
125. 386 U.S. at 20.
126. Id. at 42-43.
127. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 42-45 (opinion of Stewart, J.).
128. See MCCORMICK, supra note 23, § 183, at 431.
129. 386 U.S. at 20.
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view assumes that comment on defendant's failure to take the stand
might constitute an insignificant or technical error. To the contrary,
comment which violates the privilege against self-incrimination
arguably could rarely be insignificant or unimportant. Such com-
ment permits adverse inferences to be considered and thereby may
play a substantial part in the prosecution's case." Moreover, as
Justice Stewart predicted, utilizing the harmless error rule in in-
stances of Griffin violations actually results in burdensome case-by-
case analysis. 131 Hence, judicial economy would be better served by
an automatic reversal rule. In any event, abandoning complete pro-
tection of an accused's constitutional rights for the sake of prevent-
ing retrial of relatively few cases is an unreasonable denial of due
process. The purely technical policies of trial economy and finality of
judgment should not be allowed to prevail to the detriment of pro-
cedural justice.
Besides the general criticism that the harmless error rule
abrogates procedural due process, several objections to the rule ap-
plied by the Court in Chapman have centered particularly around
that decision. In essence, the Chapman rule requires that before a
comment can be described as "harmless" error, the court must con-
clude beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the result would not have
been different absent error; and (2) the error could not have con-
tributed to the jury's verdict."'2 By requiring proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that the remark did not play a part in conviction,
the Court implied that the considerations contributing to a jury's
verdict are separable and ascertainable.1" As a result, the rule may
be criticized as unworkable since it is usually impossible for the
court to prove the extent to which certain factors have contributed
to a defendant's conviction.' Due to these difficulties, the rule, if
literally construed, actually amounts to an automatic reversal rule.'3
5
130. Comment, Constitutional Law-Comment on Defendant's Failure to
Testify-Harmless Error, 19 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 757 (1968); see also Bruno v. United
States, 308 U.S. 287, 294 (1939).
131. Justice Stewart feared that the "harmless error" rule would demand
burdensome analyses to determine the extent to which the unconstitutional comment
influenced the outcome of each particular trial. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 45.
132. 386 U.S. at 45.
133. Comment, 19 CASE W. RES. L. REV., supra note 130, at 761.
134. The Supreme Court in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), stated, "It is
difficult, if not impossible, to prove that a confession which a jury has found to be in-
voluntary has nevertheless influenced the verdict .... " Id. at 389.
135. Mause, Harmless Constitutional Error: The Implication of Chapman v.
California, 53 MINN. L. REV. 519, 540 (1969); Note, Harmless Constitutional Error: A
Reappraisa 83 HARV. L. REV. 814, 819 (1970).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 [1979], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol13/iss2/3
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
The Court's failure to explain its meaning of "contributed to"
therefore presents a confusing problem for courts that must apply
the harmless error rule. 6
This difficulty in ascertaining the extent to which certain er-
rors of evidentiary factors have contributed to a jury's verdict has
constituted a major problem with the rule. Consequently, many
state courts have utilized the rule as a means for weighing the error
committed against the evidence presented. "7 Under this interpreta-
tion, harmless error has been found where the extent of the error
was outweighed by "overwhelming evidence of guilt.'"" This applica-
tion of the harmless error rule is contrary to the Chapman decision,
wherein the Court specifically criticized the California court's em-
phasis on an "overwhelming evidence" criterion. " The Court prefer-
red instead a much stricter standard- whether there was "a
reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have
contributed to the conviction."'" According to this language, any
standard that considers the weight of the evidence against an accus-
ed is an unacceptable implementation of the harmless error rule.
One may argue that Supreme Court decisions after Chapman
which have applied the harmless error rule to improper comments"'
show an acceptance by the Court of the "overwhelming evidence"
approach."' This contention, however, may be considerably weaken-
ed in light of a case " ' decided subsequent to Chapman. Relying on
Chapman,'" the Court reversed without discussion a Calfornia deci-
sion which had found harmless error based on the "overwhelming
evidence" approach."" Justice Traynor dissented forcefully in the
136. See notes 137-57 infra and accompanying text.
137. E.g., United States v. Haynes, 573 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1978); Berryman v.
Colbert, 538 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir. 1976); People v. Holman, 19 Ill. App. 3d 544, 311
N.E.2d 696 (1974).
138. For example, in the Berryman case the court found that although there
were five instances of prosecutorial comment which directly pointed to the defendant's
failure to take the stand, such comments amounted to only "harmless error." The court
reasoned that since there had been overwhelming and undisputed evidence of defen-
dant's guilt, the error could not have prejudiced the jury's verdict of guilt. 538 F.2d at
1250.
139. 386 U.S. at 23.
140. 386 U.S. at 24.
141. Fontaine v. California, 390 U.S. 593 (1968); Anderson v. Nelson, 390 U.S.
523 (1968).
142. See MCCORMICK, supra note 23, § 183, at 431-32.
143. Ross v. California, 391 U.S. 470 (1968).
144. The Court also relied on Anderson v. Nelson, 390 U.S. 523 (1968).
145. People v. Ross, 67 Cal. 2d 64, 429 P.2d 606, 60 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1967).
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California opinion: "Overwhelming evidence of guilt does not negate
the fact that an error ... contributed to the actual verdict reached,
for the jury may have reached its verdict without considering other
reasons untainted by error that would have supported the same
result.....6 The fact that the Court reversed the California decision
may support the proposition that it impliedly affirmed Justice
Traynor's view. More importantly, in a later case"7 the Court explicit-
ly reaffirmed its position against placing undue emphasis on over-
whelming evidence of guilt."8 Even so, language indicating that the
weight of the evidence may have played some part in harmless er-
ror cases cannot be ignored.149 Such discrepancies suggest that the
Court has been paying mere lip service to a stricter interpretation of
Chapman, while actually applying a more relaxed standard which
further erodes protection from unconstitutional infractions of the
"no comment" rule.
Also contrary to a strict interpretation of Chapman are those
decisions which have found that comment is "harmless" error unless
there has been a "machine-gun repetition" of unconstitutional
comments, calculated to make defendant's version of the evidence
worthless.' 50 Such application of the harmless error rule is erroneous
in that these courts have applied the facts of Chapman rather than
its rule. While the prosecutor in Chapman made repeated references
to the defendant's silence, the Court did not indicate that such con-
duct was necessary for a finding of reversible error.' Undoubtedly
courts have been troubled by the difficulty of applying the Chapman
test. However, requiring "machine-gun repetition" is contrary not
only to the harmless error rule, but also to the mandate that it is
the Supreme Court's responsibility "to protect federal rights by
146. 429 P.2d at 621, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 269 (Traynor, C.J., dissenting).
147. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
148. Id at 255.
149. The Court in Harrington ruled that the case against the defendant was
"so overwhelming" that the use of unconstitutional confessions as evidence against the
accused was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 254. Despite this
language, the Court expressly reaffirmed its decision in Chapman. Id In a forceful dis-
sent to the Harrington opinion, Justice Brennan stated woefully that the Court had in
effect overruled Chapman. Id- at 255.
150. People v. Garrison, 252 Cal. App. 2d 511, 60 Cal. Rptr. 596 (1967). In the
Garrison case, the comment by the court was identical to that prohibited in Griffin.
The prosecutor had also commented in his opening and closing arguments on the
defendant's failure to testify. Yet the court refused to apply the Chapman rule because
there had been no "machine-gun" repetition. See also Shultz v. Yeagar, 293 F. Supp.
794 (D.N.J.), affd, 403 F.2d 639 (3rd Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 961 (1968).
151. 386 U.S. at 22-24.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 [1979], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol13/iss2/3
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
fashioning the necessary rule."'52 While this "machine-gun" approach
has appeared only in a few states,1' it nevertheless indicates that a
loose construction of the harmless error rule creates a danger of
serious abridgment of the defendant's privilege against self-
incrimination.
Other states have rejected any application of the harmless
error rule, and require automatic reversal whenever a violation of
the Griffin "no comment" rule has been found. Since Chapman con-
tained no language preventing states from applying a stricter stan-
dard than that implemented by the Supreme Court, some states
have opted for an automatic reversal rule.'" Where the prosecutor
or the court has commented on a defendant's failure to testify, the
reviewing court will find "per se" error and will reverse without
regard to the character of the statement, or the motive or intent
with which it was made.'15 Such courts have opposed the view that
comment on a defendant's silence may be "harmless" on the ground
that the right against self-incrimination is fundamental to our
system of justice." Other courts have required automatic reversal
because of the fear that permitting some instances of comment
would be too strong a temptation for prosecutors to resist. 57 The
policies underlying the "per se" theory emphasize individual rights
and fair justice. Such policies, as seen below, are markedly different
from those underlying the "harmless error" theory.
Harmless Error and the Policies of the Privilege
The problem created by the Chapman opinion stems from its
bare declaration of the harmless error standard and its failure to
discuss, to any meaningful extent, the policy considerations underly-
ing the decision. Furthermore, the Court failed to explain why viola-
152. 386 U.S. at 20.
153. Shultz v. Yeager, 293 F. Supp. 794 (D.N.J.), affd, 403 F.2d 639 (3rd Cir.
1967). cert. denied, 394 U.S. 961 (1968); People v. Garrison, 252 Cal. App. 2d 511, 60
Cal. Rptr. 596 (1967).
154. See State v. Smith, 101 Ariz. 407, 420 P.2d 278 (1967); Edwards v. State,
SInd. - , 328 N.E.2d 470 (1975); Carter v. State, 199 So. 2d 324 (Fla. App. 1967).
People v. Alexander, 17 Mich. App. 497, 169 N.W.2d 652 (1969); State v. Gray, 503
S.W.2d 457 (Mo. App. 1973); Koller v. State, 518 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. Crim. 1975).
155. Singleton v. State, 183 So. 2d 245, 251 (Fla. App. 1966). See also Mathis v.
State, 267 So. 2d 846 (Fla. App. 1972); People v. Helm, 9 Ill. App. 3d 143, 291 N.E.2d
680 (1973); Edwards v. State, - Ind. __ , 328 N.E.2d 470 (1975); State v. Gray, 503
S.W.2d 457 (Mo. App. 1973).
156. 503 S.W.2d at 461.
157. 328 N.E.2d at 474.
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tions of the "no comment" rule in particular might amount to
"harmless" error. Consequently, state courts have applied the Chap-
man rule divergently. based upon different conceptions of the
policies underlying the defendant's rights. It may now be time for
the Supreme Court to re-evaluate the harmless error rule in light of
the underlying policies of the privilege against self-incrimination
upon which the Griffin decision was based. Such reconsideration
may lead to the conclusion that automatic reversal should be re-
quired wherever infractions of the "no comment" rule have been
committed.
As mentioned previously, one policy underlying the prohibition
of comments on a defendant's failure to exercise his right to testify
is that complete protection of the privilege against self-incrimination
is essential for the maintenance of a "fair balance" between the in-
dividual and the state."' This policy assures a fair resolution of the
case based upon accurate proof. Fair resolution of a case is
guaranteed by assuring the defendant that the exercise of his con-
stitutional right not to testify will not be spotlighted by pros-
ecutorial or judicial statements. If permitted, comment may cause
the jury to convict an accused based upon unwarranted adverse
inferences from his silence. As a result, the State could win its case
through the use of impermissible evidence, and thereby penalize the
defendant who exercises his constitutional right.59 The "no com-
ment" rule is thus a valuable implement for the preservation of a
fair and reliable criminal justice system.
Some observers have argued that the Court may have rejected
the "fair balance" policy when, in Chapman, it applied the harmless
error rule to violations of Griffin.l This view assumes that the
Chapman Court actually considered the policies underlying Griffin.
Considering the brief discussion of Griffin given by the Court in
Chapman,"' such a contention is unsupported. A better explanation
may be that the effect of the harmless error rule was not considered
to be contrary to the "fair balance" policy. Assertions that Chapman
stands for the proposition that maintaining a state-individual
balance is no longer an integral function of the privilege against self-
incrimination, therefore, are unpersuasive.
158. See notes 89-93 supra and accompanying text. Some writers refer to this
policy as the "reliability of guilt-determination process." Note, Harmless Constitutional
Error, 20 STAN. L. REV. 83, 89 (1967); Mause, supra note 135, at 538.
159. See notes 108-10 supra and accompanying text.
160. See Mause, supra note 135, at 550, for a somewhat different interpretation
of the problem presented by this argument.
161. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
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It also has been argued that proper application of the Chapman
rule will assure the reliability of the judicial system.1 2 This conten-
tion might be valid if it could be shown that state courts have con-
sistently and uniformly applied the harmless error test to violations
of the Griffin rule in a "proper" manner which assures fair justice
for the accused.163 As previously noted,'" however, the courts are far
from uniform in their application of the harmless error rule to im-
permissible comments.'" Furthermore, standards requiring
repetitious "machine-gun-like" comments before error will be found
illustrate that the Chapman rule may work grave injustices against
the accused.'" Such uses of the harmless error rule may thereby
disrupt the "fair balance" between the State and the accused.
The divergent applications of the harmless error rule among
the states"7 demonstrate that the harmless error test, when applied
to unconstitutional comments, may be contrary to the policy of
fairness underlying the privilege against self-incrimination. Perhaps
the only way to assure the fair resolution of cases is through the
automatic reversal approach. 8 This theory ensures that the accus-
ed's right to remain silent without the slightest degree of prejudice
is fundamental to the judicial system and requires the highest
degree of protection."6
Also important to the defendant's right of protection against
comment on his failure to testify is the underlying policy of depriv-
ing the State of a weapon which is subject to abuse in particularly
sensitive areas.7" This policy is obvious in the "no comment" rule
which is directed at preventing the State from commenting on a
162. See Mause, supra note 135, at 548.
163. For an example of what might be considered a proper application of the
"harmless error" rule in a way that assures a reliable guilt-determination, see Com-
monwealth v. Reichard, 211 Pa. Super. 55, 233 A.2d 603 (1967).
164. See notes 141-55 supra and accompanying text.
165. Compare the "overwhelming evidence," "machine-gun repetition," and
"automtic reversal" approaches. Id
166. See Note, 20 STAN. L. REV., supra note 158.
167. See text accompanying notes 141-55 supra.
168. "Reliability is best ensured not by inquiring on a case-by-case basis
whether the constitutional violation resulted in the conviction of an innocent person,
but rather by requiring universal observance of the basic procedural right." Note, 20
STAN. L. REV., supra note 158, at 90.
169. See Note, 19 CASE W. RES. L. REV., supra note 130, at 762-64; Note, 70
DICK. L. REV., supra note 7, at 120; see also People v. Ross, 67 Cal. 2d 64, 429 P.2d 606,
615-21, 60 Cal. Rptr. 254, 263-70 (1967) (Traynor, C.J., dissenting), rev'd, 391 U.S. 470
(1968).
170. Griswold, supra note 92, at 223.
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defendant's silence. Possibly, an automatic reversal rule based on
this "deterrence" policy should be applied only to those cases in
which the constitutional error depends on the knowing misconduct
of the prosecutor."' A less pedantic interpretation of the deterrence
function, however, suggests that the privilege against self-
incrimination serves to protect judicial integrity by removing even
temptations for abuse. 7' Such protection would be undermined
where the existence of any opportunity for a prosecutor to comment
on defendant's failure to take the stand creates such an irresistible
temptation so as to invite abuse.
In addition to the danger of inviting abuse, it is conceivable
that under the Chapman rule a remark made by a prosecutor with
full knowledge that it violated the "no comment" rule may be held
harmless. 8 Even where the harmless error rule is strictly con-
strued, a prosecutor could knowingly make impermissible comments.
For example, a prosecutor may make a seemingly unintentional
reference to an accused's failure to testify, but if accompanied by
certain gestures or glances, the comment might actually play a
substantial part in the jury's verdict.7 " On appeal, however, the
record would reflect only the bare comment which by itself looks
like a harmless error. The only security against such abuse may be
total prohibition of the temptation.'75 The policy against inviting
abuse thus may be another strong reason for requiring an automatic
reversal for all violations of Griffin.
In light of the foregoing analysis, the Chapman "harmless er-
ror" rule, when applied to comments on defendant's failure to
testify, may be a harmful rule. The more recent decisions are
unclear as to whether the Court has shown a willingness to relax
the Chapman rule. Indeed, it may be that the Court itself is unsure
as to how the harmless error rule should be applied. This lack of a
definite framework indicates that reevaluation of the rule as ap-
plied to unconstitutional comments is badly needed. The rule has
frustrated fundamental notions of due process, and particularly has
thwarted the basic policies underlying the privilege against self-
incrimination. In fact, the harmless error rule has not achieved the
end sought by the Court in Chapman: to formulate a rule that will
171. Mause, supra note 135, at 553.
172. See note 92 supra and accompanying text.
173. See notes 141-52 supra and accompanying text.
174. See Comment, 19 CASE W. RES. L. REV., supra note 130, at 763.
175. See Note, 20 STAN. L. REV.. supra note 158, at 90.
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save the good in harmless error practices while avoiding the bad. 17
When applied to comments on a defendant's silence, the "bad" in
harmless error may substantially outweigh the "good." The only
safeguard for the accused, therefore, may be an automatic reversal
requirement for all instances of impermissible comments on his
failure to testify.
JURY INSTRUCTION ON DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT
As VIOLATING THE "NO COMMENT" RULE
After Griffin v. California,7 " liberal safeguards for the rights of
the accused against unconstitutional comment seemed guaranteed
by the fifth amendment. Due process and the protection of in-
dividual rights were strongly emphasized as policies underlying the
fifth amendment."8 It appeared as though the criminal defendant
could expect an impenetrable privilege against self-incrimination.
Yet the question of whether the right against unconstitutional com-
ments was so fundamental as to require reversal for violations of
the "no comment" rule remained unanswered until Chapman.'79 In
holding that a violation of defendant's right to remain silent might
constitute "harmless" error, the Chapman court overlooked the
more liberal policies which influenced the Griffin decision, and
thereby implied that further attempts to broaden the scope of the
privilege would be curtailed.'
The Griffin court also left undetermined the question of
whether instructions from the court that defendant's silence should
not be consrtued against him, given over defendant's objections,
should be considered a forbidden violation of his constitutional
rights. Influenced by liberally interpreted policies underlying the
fifth and fourteenth amendments,' the Griffin Court might have
considered such practice a violation of the privilege against self-
incrimination. This possibility became doubtful, however, when the
Chapman Court affirmed state power over certain aspects of state
criminal procedure."8 2 State and federal courts, unsure of which
approach to take, split on the issue of whether instructions over
defendant's objection were constitutionally permissible.'
176. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1968).
177. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
178. See text accompanying notes 84-93 supra.
179. See text accompanying notes 118-23 supra
180. See notes 119-24 supra and accompanying text.
181. See note 6 supra.
182. See notes 119-24 supra and accompanying text.
183. For cases holding the giving of instructions was proper, see United States
v. Carter, 422 F.2d 519 (6th Cir. 1970); State v. McAlvain, 104 Ariz. 445, 454 P.2d 987
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Predictably, the Supreme Court held fast to its trend against
further expansion of the fifth amendment.18 ' This has been reflected
in the most recent decision involving interpretation of the "no com-
ment" rule under the fifth amendment, Lakeside v. Oregon.8 5 The
Supreme Court held in Lakeside that a court's instructions that the
defendant had the right not to testify and that such silence should
not be construed as evidence against him, did not violate the
privilege against self-incrimination.' This was true even though the
defendant had objected to the instruction. Whether or not the
arguments supporting such a decision are justifiable in light of fun-
damental fifth amendment policies will be considered below.
"Failure-to-Testify" Instructions and the Privilege- Policies
One of the most obvious and basic policies underlying the
privilege against self-incrimination is that of protecting the accused
from unjust conviction."8 1 Cases involving "failure-to-testify" instruc-
tions have introduced a troublesome twist to the problem of protecting
the accused from an unfair verdict. Advocates of such instructions con-
tend that under most circumstances the judge's charge to the jury
actually benefits the accused.'" This view is based on the belief that
the jury, even without comment from the judge or prosecutor, will
notice that the accused did not testify and probably will draw
adverse inferences from that silence.'89 This viewpoint suggests that
a judge's instructions are helpful to the defendant since they
remove the possibility of adverse inferences. Accordingly, the jury
charge, despite defendant's objections, would present no danger of
unjust conviction to the accused, and may in fact protect him from
(1969); People v. Cooper, 10 Cal. App. 3d 96, 88 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1970); State v. LaBreck,
159 Conn. 346, 269 A.2d 74 (1970); People v. Thomas, 27 Mich. App. 637, 183 N.W.2d
860 (1970); State v. Smart, 485 S.W.2d 90 (Mo. 1970); People v. Mulligan, 40 A.D.2d 165,
338 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1972); State v. East, 3 Wash. App. 128, 474 P.2d 582 (1970). For cases
holding the giving of instructions was improper, see United States v. Smith, 392 F.2d
302 (4th Cir. 1968); Russell v. State, 240 Ark. 97, 398 S.W.2d 213 (1966); Hill v. State,
- Ind. -, 371 N.E.2d 1303 (1978); People v. Hampton, 394 Mich. 437, 231 N.W.2d
654 (1975); State v. Rosen, 280 Minn. 550, 158 N.W.2d 202 (1968); Villenes v. State, 492
P.2d 343 (Okla. Crim. 1971).
184. See notes 141-49 supra and accompanying text.
185. 435 U.S. 333 (1978).
186. Id. at 339.
187. See notes 84-89 supra and accompanying text.
188. United States v. Bailey, 526 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
942 (1976); State v. Garcia, 84 N.M. 519, 505 P.2d 862 (1972).
189. See United States v. Garcia, 84 N.M. 519, 505 P.2d 862 (1972).
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such danger.'" Hence, it might be argued that such instruction ac-
tually supports the policy against unjust conviction.
The view that failure-to-testify instructions benefit the accused
is rather myopic since it ignores the dangers inherent in such in-
structions. What appears on the surface to be a benefit actually may
be detrimental to a defendant who objects to the jury charge.
Arguably, permitting instructions on the accused's right to remain
silent, over his objections, amounts to comment that is prohibited
under the Griffin rule,' and such instructions constitute "compul-
sion" in violation of the privilege against self-incrimination.'" Of
course, compulsion under these circumstances does not amount to
literal compulsion, but direct pressure has been long abandoned as a
requirement of the privilege.' 3 Compulsive force arises whenever
penalty is threatened.'" Failure-to-testify instructions may create a
penalty by increasing the danger of unfair presumptions against the
defendant. 1' 5 As a result, such instructions may subject the accused
to the risk of an unjust conviction and thereby circumvent the pro-
tective purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination.
Basic to the privilege is the notion that a defendant's failure to
testify shall not create any presumption against him.1" This constitu-
tional mandate was interpreted by the Court in Wilson v. United
States'7 as excluding all references to defendant's silence.' Fur-
thermore, Griffin specifically held that the State may not add in any
way to those inferences already present in the jurors' minds.'" Even
190. "The very purpose is to remove from the jury's deliberation any influence
of unspoken adverse inference." 435 U.S. at 339.
191. People v. Brady, 275 Cal. App. 2d 984, 80 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1969); People v.
Horrigan, 253 Cal. 2d 519, 61 Cal. Rptr. 403 (1967); People v. Molano, 253 Cal. 2d 841,
61 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1967); Hill v. State, - Ind. - , 371 N.E.2d 1303 (1978).
192. See note 195 infra.
193. See Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972); Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). The Brooks case involved a state
statute that required a defendant to testify immediately after the government's case
closed, or forfeit the right. Although the state had a legitimate purpose-preventing a
defendant from adapting his testimony to his witnesses' testimony -the procedure was
"not a constitutionally permissible means of insuring his honesty." 406 U.S. at 611.
194. See Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 345 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
195. "It is more probable than not that the subtle adverse influence which the
silence of the accused produces is augmented when it is specifically pointed out to a
jury by an authoritative figure." Comment, 25 OHIO S.L.J., supra note 86, at 585.
196. See Act of March 16, 1878, 20 Stat. 30, c. 37.
197. Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60 (1893).
198. Id. at 67.
199. 380 U.S. at 614.
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though a jury may already have some impressions from the defen-
dant's silence, instructions from the court may highlight and em-
phasize the fact that the accused did not take the stand.2 Thus, in-
structions from the court may add to the weight of those inferences
previously drawn by the jury and thereby solemnize the defendant's
silence into evidence against him, °1" as prohibited by Griffin.
Supporters of failure-to-testify instructions contend that such
instructions, even when issued over defendant's objections, do not
violate the Griffin rule or the fifth amendment, because the jury
charge merely explains the correct law, whereas the "no comment"
rule is limited to adverse comments. 02 This view, however, may be
too narrow. It overlooks the fact that although the instruction is not
adverse on its face, it could have serious adverse effects on the
defendant by drawing the attention of the jury to his failure to take
the stand." 8 Unfavorable inferences, enhanced by instructions refer-
ring to defendant's silence, clearly are contrary to the policy of pro-
tecting an accused from unjust conviction. Such practice, therefore,
weakens the privilege against self-incrimination, and may harm,
rather than assist, a defendant.
Besides being contrary to the policy of protection from unjust
conviction, permitting failure-to-testify instructions despite a defen-
dant's objections also may be incompatible with the "fair-balance"
policy.2"' A fundamental purpose of the privilege against self-
incrimination is making the judicial process a fair contest between
the state and the individual. 5 Permitting the State to comment on
defendant's failure to testify, however, may conflict with this fifth
amendment policy and procedural due process. States holding that
failure-to-testify instructions do not abridge the accused's constitu-
tional rights assume such instructions always guarantee a fair trial
by advising the jury of the defendant's rights.2 " On the contrary,
200. People v. Molano, 253 Cal. App. 2d 841, 61 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1967); People v.
Horrigan, 253 Cal. App. 2d 519, 61 Cal. Rptr. 403 (1967).
201. 380 U.S. at 614.
202. 435 U.S. at 338. See also Hill v. State, - Ind. - 371 N.E.2d 1303,
1307 (1978) (Pivarnik, J., dissenting).
203. "For the judge ... to call the defendant's failure to testify to the jury's at-
tention has an undeniably adverse affect on the defendant. Even if jurors try faithfully
to obey their instructions, the connection between silence and guilt is often too direct
and too natural to be resisted." 435 U.S. at 345 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
204. See notes 90-93 and 158-59 supra and accompanying text.
205. Id.
206. E.g., Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 354 Mass. 598, 239 N.E.2d 5 (1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1056 (1969).
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such practice may encourage unwarranted presumptions on the part
of the jury, and thereby unfairly add to the State's evidence. 01 The
Court has stated expressly: "Governments, both state and federal,
are thus constitutionally compelled to establish guilt by evidence in-
dependently and freely secured."20 8 This mandate ensures the
maintenance of a fair state-individual balance by requiring the
government to "shoulder the entire load."2' Allowing the court to
spotlight a defendant's silence when he believes the instruction
would damage his case, however, may upset this balance.1 0 Conse-
quently, failure-to-testify instructions may work against the fifth
amendment privilege and the "fair-balance" policy.
The privilege against self-incrimination is also aimed at preserv-
ing integrity and reliability in the judicial system,' and inherent in
this policy is the guarantee of due process for the accused. Basic to
procedural due process is the notion that a defendant should not be
required to aid the State in his conviction. 12 Permitting inferences
from failure-to-testify instructions arguably amounts to "aid" which
violates the privilege against self-incrimination. Furthermore,
eliminating the instuction on request does not hinder trial pro-
cedure, but merely removes the advantage of calling attention to
the accused's silence."2 Unless the defendant chooses to speak in the
"unfettered exercise of his own will," calling attention to his silence
is prohibited by the Constitution. 1' Arguably, forcing the defendant
who objects to failure-to-testify instructions into accepting the same
violates his right against unconstitutional comment."5 Hence, where
an accused expressly requests that no instruction on the subject of
207. See Comment, 25 OHIO S.L.J., supra note 86, at 585; see also Lakeside v.
Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 345 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
208. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
209. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
210. The Court in the Wilson case stated, "The minds of the jurors can only re-
main unaffected . . .by excluding all references to [accused's failure to testify]." 149
U.S. at 67 (emphasis added).
211. See notes 86-92 and 162-69 supra and accompanying text.
212. See Field, The Right to Silence: A Rejoinder to Professor Cross, 11 J.
Soc. PUB. T.L. 76 (1970). Field suggests it is right not to allow either the prosecutor or
judge to comment upon defendant's silence: "To permit it would load the dice against
him even more than would be the case if his failure to testify passed without
comment." Id. at 78.
213. Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 347 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
214. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
215. Russel v. State, 240 Ark. 97, 398 S.W.2d 213 (1966); People v. Brady, 275
Cal. App. 2d 984, 80 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1969); People v. Hampton, 394 Mich. 437, 231
N.W.2d 654 (1975); Villenes v. State, 492 P.2d 343 (Okla. Crim. 1971).
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his silence be given, due process requires that he should have the
right to say whether or not his silence should be spotlighted for the
jury's attention."'
Permitting the State to abridge this right while gaining eviden-
tiary advantages from the defendant's silence is contrary to the
policy of preserving integrity and reliability within the guilt-
determination process. Abrogation of these policies may upset the
fair balance between the accused and the State, and thereby
threaten the defendant with unjust conviction. The practice of giv-
ing failure-to-testify instructions despite a defendant's objections,
therefore, undermines the policies surrounding the privilege against
self-incrimination which have justified liberally protecting an accus-
ed from unconstitutional comment upon his silence.
Some courts have held that in order for the privilege to be ful-
ly effectuated it is paramount that no remarks whatever be cast
against the accused for his failure to take the stand.117 Such conten-
tions appear unrealistic since a defendant may request jury instruc-
tions that may actually benefit his case. This benefit will occur
where the jury fully obeys the court's instructions on a defendant's
right to remain silent. Yet it still may be said that to assure fair
resolution of the cases based on untainted evidence, it is necessary
to closely regulate all judicial statements regarding the accused's
silence.21
8
Implications of Lakeside v. Oregon
The privilege against self-incrimination, together with broad
notions of individual rights, have supported stringent protection of
the accused from comment upon his failure to testify. The trend
towards liberal policy interpretations marked by the Griffin case,21
however, has been halted by the Burger Court, as evidenced by its
decision in Lakeside v. Oregon.'
The main issue before the Supreme Court in Lakeside was
whether failure-to-testify instructions infringed upon defendant's
216. In Russel4 the Arkansas Supreme Court reasoned that since the accused
has the unfettered right to testify or not to testify, he should have the correlative
right to say whether or not his silence should be brought to the attention of the jury.
398 S.W.2d at 215.
217. Gross v. State, 261 Ind. 489, 306 N.E.2d 371 (1974).
218. Id.
219. See notes 96-111 supra and accompanying text.
220. 435 U.S. 333 (1978).
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constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. 21 The defendant in
Lakeside did not take the witness stand at his trial. Over his objec-
tion, the trial judge instructed the jury not to draw any adverse in-
ferences from the accused's decision not to testify. The Oregon
Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on the ground that the
better rule was not to give the instructions over the objections of
defendant's counsel.' The Oregon Supreme Court reinstated the
conviction, holding that the giving of the charge over the objection
did not violate the accused's constitutional rights.2" The defendant
appealed to the Supreme Court, maintaining that failure-to-testify
instructions amounted to comment which violated "no comment"
principles.
The Court rejected the defendant's contention that the failure-
to-testify instruction given over his objection was prohibited by the
fifth and fourteenth amendments."' The Lakeside Court interpreted
the Griffin "no comment" rule as being limited to adverse comment;
and since the instruction was not "adverse comment" it was not pro-
hibited under the rule." The Court reasoned further that a
necessary element of self-incrimination was some kind of compul-
sion, and that a jury charge could not produce the degree of
pressure found impermissible in Griffin.' The defendant's conten-
tion that the instruction encouraged the jury to draw adverse
inferences was likewise rejected. The majority of the Justices main-
tained that the very purpose of the charge was "to remove from the
jury's deliberation any influence of unspoken adverse inferences."' "
With minimal further discussion, the Court held that instructions on
the defendant's failure to testify given over his objections did not'
violate the privilege against self-incrimination. 2 8
The Lakeside decision indicates that the Court has erected
substantial barriers to further attempts at broadening the scope of
the privilege against self-incrimination. Unlike the Griffin case,
221. The defendant's second argument was based on his constitutional right to
counsel. The Court rejected the argument that this right had been violated when the
trial judge refused defense counsel's request that the instruction not be given. Such ac-
tion, the Court held, was not an unconstitutional interference with counsel's trial
strategy.
222. 25 Or. App. 539, 542, 549 P.2d 1287, 1288 (1976).
223. 227 Or. 569, 561 P.2d 612 (1977).
224. 435 U.S. at 338.
225. Id. at 338-39.
226. Id. at 339-40.
227. Id. at 339.
228. Id.
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Lakeside has narrowly construed the privilege by giving little con-
sideration to its underlying policies. The present trend seems to
reflect a disregard for liberal policy justifications underlying the
privilege.' Rather than giving weight to those policies supporting
absolute protection for the individual against self-incrimination, the
current emphasis is on state interests in state criminal procedure."'
Yet, the Court has not articulated what those interests are, nor why
they are so compelling. Such emphasis on state sovereignty is
reminiscent of the historical limitations of federalism which was re-
jected long ago when the Court determined that unconstitutional
comment was a matter for federal, rather than state, concern."' A
danger presented by this trend is that in balancing state and in-
dividual interests, the underlying policies will be ignored whenever
a defendant's right against comment on his failure to testify con-
flicts with state interests. Consequently, the defendant will be faced
with greater threats to due process and the privilege against self-
incrimination, since the Court seems no longer persuaded by liberal
policy arguments.
CONCLUSION
The privilege against self-incrimination emerged in England as
a flexible but narrowly defined concept designed to combat
inhumane treatment of the accused. After such treatment was pro-
hibited, the privilege survived as a means of preventing unfair trial
procedure and was incorporated into the United States Constitution.
Although historical limitations on the privilege and emphasis on
state sovereignty at first slowed the growth of the privilege, its
scope expanded as interest in individual rights increased. Enhanced
and influenced by surrounding policy, the privilege was expanded by
the Griffin Court holding that the fifth amendment protected an ac-
cused from comment on his failure to testify. The Griffin decision
implied that the choice of whether to testify at trial was to be made
free of any pressures. This language, however, proved to be decep-
tively broad; the Court subsequently held in Chapman that
unconstitutional comment may constitute "harmless" error. The
Chapman decision illustrated renewed interest in federalism, which
necessarily implied narrow interpretation of policies underlying the
229. The Court stated that "each state is, of course, free to forbid its trial
judges from [giving cautionary instructions] as a matter of state law." Id.
230. See Ritchie, Compulsion That Violates the Fifth Amendment: The
Burger Court's Definition, 61 MINN. L. REV. 383, 431 (1977).
231. See notes 78-83 supra and accompanying text.
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privilege. Similarly, the Burger Court, as demonstrated by the
Lakeside decision, seems less concerned with the logic and policy of
the privilege, and has halted its expansion.282 Moreover, Lakeside
manifests a regressive trend rather than a mere refusal to expand
the privilege against unconstitutional comment,238 since it reaches
back to traditional interpretations to support its conservative ap-
plication of the privilege. Hence, the future of this right is not a prom-
ising one for advocates of liberal expansion.
Since the right to courtroom silence is such a fundamental
feature of the privilege, it is deserving of the most stringent protec-
tion by the Court.28' For example, unconstitutional comment on
defendant's failure to testify should not be deemed "cured" by a
trial court's admonishment that the jury disregard that comment.8'
Also, a defendant who has failed to object to improper comment
should not be deemed to have "waived" his right to object on ap-
peal."' It is submitted that a defendant's constitutional right against
comment on his silence is so basic to the privilege against self-
incrimination that it cannot be waived by the failure to object; nor
can such comment be cured by a court's admonishment. These
views, however, will not likely be accepted by the present Court,
which deprives the privilege of much of its force and leaves the
regulation of state criminal procedure, for the most part, to the
states.
Beth A. Brown
232. See Berger, The Unprivileged Status of the Fifth Amendment Privilege,
15 AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 191, 192 (1978).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 200.
235. State and federal courts are currently divided on the issue of whether un-
constitutional comment by the judge or prosecutor is such error as may be "cured" by
cautionary instructions. See State v. Martin, 84 N.M. 27, 498 P.2d 1370 (1972); Com-
monwealth v. Reichard, 211 Pa. Super. 55, 233 A.2d 603 (1967) (error not cured). But
see United States v. Wells, 431 F.2d 434 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 997 (1970);
Moore v. State, - Ind. __ , 369 N.E.2d 628 (1977) (error cured).
236. State and federal courts are presently split on the issue of whether a
defendant who fails to object at trial to unconstitutional comment has thereby waived
that objection on appeal. See State v. Byrd, 109 Ariz. 10, 503 P.2d 958 (1972); State v.
Winger, 26 Utah 2d 118, 485 P.2d 1398 (1971) (right to complain held waived). But see
United States v. Flannery, 451 F.2d 880 (1st Cir. 1971); State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61,
327 A.2d 576 (1973) (right to complain not waived).
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